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Abstract 
Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, many empirical studies find a high degree of 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). However, the resulting macroeconomic effects 
seem to be surprisingly weak. This contradiction can be explained within an intertemporal 
framework in which DNWR not only prevents nominal wage cuts but also induces firms to 
compress wage increases. We analyze whether a compression of wage increases occurs when 
DNWR is binding by applying Unconditional Quantile Regression and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression to a data set comprising more than 169 million wage changes. We find evidence 
for a compression of wage increases and only very small effects of DNWR on average real 
wage growth. The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument against low 
inflation targets. 
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1. Introduction 
Concerns about potentially adverse employment effects of low inflation have given rise to a 
plethora of studies on the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), such as the 
micro-econometric multi-country studies of Behr and Poetter (2010), Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2009) and Dickens et al. (2007) or the survey evidence provided by Bewley (1999).1 These 
concerns are based on Tobin’s (1972) hypothesis that if nominal wages are downwardly rigid 
a certain amount of positive inflation may be necessary to ease firms’ real wage adjustments 
in response to idiosyncratic shocks (“inflation may grease the wheels of the labor market”). 
Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, microeconometric studies usually find a high 
degree of DNWR. However, the resulting macroeconomic effects on aggregate real wages 
and employment seem to be surprisingly weak, leading Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a 
“micro-macro puzzle”. 
A possible solution to that puzzle has been offered by Elsby (2009), who develops an 
intertemporal model in which downward wage rigidity arises because nominal wage cuts are 
followed by sharp decreases in productivity. Wage increases therefore become irreversible to 
some degree. Firms that increase wages during upswings may find it difficult to reverse their 
decisions later when the economic environment will possibly deteriorate. Forward-looking 
firms take the path dependence of wage changes into account when determining the optimal 
wage policy; they refrain from large wage increases in order to reduce the probability of 
costly future nominal wage cuts. Moreover, since DNWR raises the wage level inherited from 
the past, firms do not have to raise wages as much or as often as in a situation without wage 
rigidity to obtain the profit-maximizing wage level. As a consequence, firms will compress 
wage increases as well as wage cuts in the presence of DNWR. This leads to the surprising 
prediction that average real wage growth, and hence aggregate real wages, should not be 
affected by DNWR, and that the aggregate employment effects should be weak or non-
existent. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, we extend the empirical 
approach of Elsby (2009) by applying Unconditional Quantile Regressions (UQR) to the data, 
in addition to variants of Elsby’s (2009) OLS model specification. The latter only allows the 
use of aggregate data on the regional level, whereas the application of UQR enables us to take 
account of the variance and the cross variable covariance in the micro data. Second, we 
provide an empirical analysis of the effects of inflation on the shape of the real wage change 
distribution for Germany, a country with stronger labor unions and a higher labor union 
density than in the US and GB – for which Elsby provides empirical evidence. Our analysis 
                                                 
1
 Dickens et al. (2007) also deal with the extent of real wage rigidities. Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) have 
carried out a multi-country study on downward nominal wage rigidity using industry data. 
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provides some insights into whether Elsby’s (2009) predictions can be observed in a country 
that may already be affected by wage compression due to its labour market institutions. In line 
with the empirical literature on DNWR the analysis focuses on the wage change distribution 
of job stayers, whereas Elsby’s analysis also includes job movers. This inclusion could lead to 
a systematic relationship between inflation and the compression of the real wage change 
distribution that has nothing to do with downward nominal wage rigidity. The reason is that 
during economic upswings inflation often rises, and at the same time more voluntary job 
changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage increases (see e.g., Cornelißen et al., 
2007). 
The empirical analysis is undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 using the 
IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File, of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The BeH 
comprises the total population gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. 
After our data selection, the remaining spells enable us to analyze over 169 million earnings 
changes amounting to more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year on average. Among the 
main advantages of this dataset are the sheer wealth of information and the high reliability of 
the earnings data, which is due to plausibility checks performed by the social security 
institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting. In contrast to studies based 
on compensation data from household surveys, measurement error due to erroneous reporting 
does not arise in our analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the key 
findings of Elsby’s (2009) model. Section 3 contains the data description. Section 4 presents 
our empirical implementation and results as well as a comparison with Elsby’s results. 
Section 5 deals with the macroeconomic implications, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Model 
In this section we explain the main idea of the underlying model and present the key findings 
needed for the empirical testing. 
The main feature of Elsby’s (2009) intertemporal model of worker resistance to wage cuts is 
that wage increases become irreversible to some degree because nominal wage cuts lead to a 
sharp decrease in productivity. This assumption is based on Bewley’s (1999) findings that a 
key reason for the reluctance to cut nominal wages is the belief that nominal wage reductions 
could damage worker morale, and that morale is a key determinant of worker productivity. A 
wage increase will raise productivity, however, a wage cut of the same amount will reduce 
productivity by a greater amount. Formally, this is captured by an effort function in the spirit 
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of the fair-wage effort hypothesis of Solow (1979) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986), with an 
additional term reflecting the impact of nominal wage cuts on effort. 
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the productivity costs of a nominal wage cut to the firm, and ( )⋅I  is the indicator function for 
a nominal wage cut. Real unemployment benefits PBb =  are assumed to be constant over 
time, where B  denotes nominal unemployment benefits and P  is the price level. The price 
level evolves according to 1−= tt PeP pi , where pi reflects the inflation rate. 
Given the effort function ( )1 , Elsby (2009) considers a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model. 
In the model price-taking worker-firm pairs maximize the expected discounted value of 
profits by choosing the nominal wage tW  at each date t . The worker-firms’ productivity 
function is given by ( ) ePA × , where A  denotes a nominal technology shock. The shock is 
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has the implication that average nominal productivity rises in line with inflation pi
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where )1,0[∈β  is the real discount factor of the firm. Lagged values are denoted by the 
subscript -1, and forward values by a prime. By setting 0=c  the model is reduced to a 
frictionless model. It can be shown that frictionless nominal wages are equal to the nominal 
shock A , hence wage changes fully reflect changes in productivity.  
DNWR changes the shape of the frictionless wage change distribution in two characteristic 
ways. First, there is a range of values for the nominal shock A , for which the firm finds it 
optimal not to change the nominal wage. This leads to a spike at zero in the nominal wage 
change distribution and accordingly to a spike at minus the inflation rate in the real wage 
change distribution. Second, if the change in A  is strong enough and the firm decides to 
change the nominal wage, the wage change will be compressed relatively to the frictionless 
case. Not surprisingly, wage cuts are compressed because they imply a discontinuous fall in 
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productivity at the margins. More interestingly, the model predicts that wage increases are 
compressed as well. One reason is that forward-looking firms take the path dependence of 
wage changes into account when determining the optimal wage policy; they refrain from large 
wage increases in order to reduce the probability of costly future nominal wage cuts. 
Moreover, the firms will in general inherit higher wages from the past. Consequently, firms 
do not have to increase nominal wages by as much or as often in order to achieve the desired 
wage level. 
Figure 1 shows simulated real wage change distributions for high and low inflation based on 
the predictions of the theoretical model. One can see that real wage increases are compressed 
in the case of low inflation.2 
Fig. 1. Figure shows simulated log real wage change distributions after 15 iterations. The distributions have been 
simulated using Elsby’s (2009) model. Own simulation of 10,000 wage changes with DNWR (c = 0.06). Further 
model settings: 1% productivity growth; β = 0.97. 
Notice that in the absence of DNWR a change in the productivity growth rate should lead to a 
one-to-one shift of the real wage change distribution, whereas a change in the inflation rate 
should leave the distribution unaltered. In contrast, if DNWR exists, one should observe a 
                                                 
2
  In the simulation the rate of productivity growth has been kept constant. Similar effects on the real wage 
change distribution are obtained if the (average) rate of productivity growth is changed instead of a change in 
the inflation rate. 
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systematic relationship between changes in the inflation rate and/or productivity growth rate 
on the one hand and changes in the shape of the real wage change distribution on the other 
hand. In the following, we will focus on the impact of the inflation rate on the shape of the 
real wage change distribution because the inflation rate can be controlled by monetary policy. 
The compression of nominal wage changes will have effects on the percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution. If DNWR is present, the model generates the following predictions 
about the effect of the inflation rate on the percentiles of the real wage change distribution, 
depending on whether the percentiles 
1. lie below the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
2. lie in the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
3. lie above the range of zero nominal wage changes. 
(1) Nominal wage cuts will be compressed relatively to the frictionless case, because of the 
implied fall in productivity. The probability that a firm is willing to increase nominal wages 
will increase as the inflation rate and productivity growth rise. With higher inflation and/or 
higher productivity growth a firm is more likely to reverse nominal wage cuts in the future. 
As a result, a firm is less inclined to incur the costs of wage cuts. With higher inflation one 
should therefore observe fewer and less pronounced nominal wage cuts. The model therefore 
implies that low percentiles of the real wage change distribution, lying below the range of 
zero nominal wage change, will rise with the inflation rate and productivity growth. 
(2) Because of DNWR a non-negligible range of the percentiles of real wage changes will 
correspond exactly to zero nominal wage changes and therefore be equal to minus the 
inflation rate. The model implies that those percentiles of the real wage change distribution 
fall one-to-one with the inflation rate. With higher inflation firms affected by DNWR are able 
to achieve reductions in real labor costs without falling back on costly nominal wage cuts. It is 
in this sense that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market in the presence of DNWR. 
(3) In an uncertain world a firm affected by DNWR will also compress nominal wage 
increases because raising wages increases the risk of costly future nominal wage cuts. If 
inflation is low, upper percentiles of the wage change distribution will, therefore, be reduced 
relative to the frictionless case. The probability that a firm wishes to reduce nominal wages 
will decline when the inflation rate and productivity growth rise. In this case, firms are less 
likely to cut wages in the future, and no longer need to restrain increases as much as a 
precaution against future costly nominal wage cuts. On average this should lead to a more 
than one-to-one increase of the upper percentiles of real wage change distribution with 
productivity growth as well as to an increase with inflation. 
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Because of this, one expects the following coefficients in a regression of the percentiles of the 
log real wage change distribution on the inflation rate and the productivity growth rate as 
explanatory variables (see Table 1): 
Table 1: Predicted effects of the rate of inflation and of productivity growth on the 
unconditional percentiles of the log real wage change distribution 
τ th percentile of the log real 
wage change distribution  
Coefficient on 
inflation rate productivity growth 
<τP  minus inflation rate > 0 > 1 
≈τP  minus inflation rate < 0 attenuates towards zero (< 1) 
>τP  minus inflation rate > 0 > 1 
 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis is undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 using the 
IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The BeH 
comprises the total population gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. 
Not covered are self-employed, family workers assisting in the operation of a family business, 
civil servants (Beamte) and regular students. For the years 1975 until 2007, the BeH contains 
information about 72,695,902 people as well as 1,171,326,023 employment spells (IAB 
Beschäftigten-Historik, 2009). Important advantages of this dataset are the enormous amount 
of information and the high reliability of the earnings data, which is due to plausibility checks 
performed by the social security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for 
misreporting. In contrast to studies based on compensation data from household surveys 
measurement error due to erroneous reporting should not arise in our analysis. 
The earnings data are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemes-
sungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored earnings changes cannot be 
computed. For our analysis we use non-censored earnings spells of male employees from 
West Germany aged 16 to 65. In line with the literature our analysis is confined to “job 
stayers”, i.e. employees who have a “stable employment relationship” with an employer. 
Usually, job stayers are defined as full-time working employees who do not change the 
employer between two consecutive time periods. We apply a narrower and better suited 
concept and require that the employee continually exercises the same job at the same 
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employer for at least two consecutive years.3 In contrast to our data selection Elsby (2009) 
includes job movers in his analysis. This inclusion could lead to a systematic relationship 
between inflation and the compression of the wage change distribution that has nothing to do 
with downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). The reason is that during economic 
upswings inflation usually rises, and at the same time more voluntary job changes occur that 
go hand in hand with real wage increases (Cornelißen et al., 2007). 
After the selection 169 million earnings changes remain in our sample. We are therefore able 
to analyze an average of more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year. The sample size is a 
large advantage in comparison to the data applied in Elsby (2009). His largest data set, the 
NES for Great Britain, allows him to analyze on average less than 74,000 observations per 
year. For the US it is less than 24,000 (1,800) observations using the CPS (PSID). A further 
advantage of the German data is the longer time period of 32 years compared to 21-24 years 
in Elsby’s analysis. A disadvantage of the German data is the fact that we are not able to 
observe hourly wages, but daily wages. There is also the problem that shifts from part-time to 
full-time work and vice versa that occur during the course of the year do not lead to a new 
report of the employer.4 Since such shifts are much more common for female employees (see 
e.g., Schäfer and Vogel, 2005), we exclude women from our analysis. This is in contrast to 
Elsby’s analysis in which male and female employees are included. 
As inflation rate we use the log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and alternatively 
the log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany. The CPI is more relevant for 
employees, whereas the PPI is crucial for firms’ wage setting. Following Elsby (2009), we 
measure productivity growth using the observed average regional real wage change. The 
reason for not directly using a productivity measure is that real wages adjust to changes in 
productivity with a time lag. We would have to model some kind of error-correction 
mechanism for the discrepancy between real wage changes and productivity growth. We can 
avoid these complications by using the average regional real wage change as a proxy variable 
reflecting the impact of (regional) productivity growth on wages. It is a suitable proxy since 
according to the theoretical predictions DNWR should have no effect on average wage 
changes. 
Among the other control variables the absolute change in the rate of inflation is included. This 
is motivated by the hypothesis of Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) that higher inflation 
volatility yields greater dispersion in relative wages regardless of the existence of DNWR. 
                                                 
3
  The breakdown of occupations is very detailed, but still not every job change leads to a change in the 
occupation classification. Therefore, some spells of persons who changed the job within a firm may not be 
excluded. The narrower “same position”-restriction has also been applied by Christofides and Stengos 
(2001). 
4
  A new state is conveyed with the annual report at the end of a year. This state applies for the whole year. 
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The current and lagged regional unemployment rates are included because DNWR may affect 
unemployment. The unemployment rates are used to control for changes in the wage change 
distribution due to workers “leaving” the distribution. Further control variables for the applied 
regression methods are shown in Table 2. For more details concerning the data and the data 
selection see Appendix A. 
Table 2: Variables for the applied regression methods 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
/ OLS Regression 
Unconditional Quantile 
Regression 
Dependent Variable 
Real wage change 
τ th percentile from re-weighted 
regional log real wage change 
distribution 
Recentered influence function (RIF) 
of the individual log real wage change 
Explanatory Variables 
Inflation rate Log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany Alternatively: log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany 
Productivity growth  Average regional real wage change 
Further Control Variables  
Micro Variables 
Age  Mean age of employees in region Age Age squared 
Education Percentages of employees in region 
within 7 educational classes Education class of employee 
Foreign nationality Percentage of employees in region 
with foreign nationality 
Dummy for employee with foreign 
nationality 
Occupation Percentages of employees in region 
within 6 occupational fields Occupation field of the employee 
Worker Percentage of white-collar worker in the region Dummy for white-collar worker 
Regional Variables 
Absolute change in 
the rate of inflation Absolute change in the rate of inflation (CPI or PPI) 
Unemployment rate Current regional unemployment rate 
Lagged regional unemployment rate 
Dummy Variables 
Year 1984 
Before 1984 the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. 
Since 1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to social 
security taxation and are therefore included in the data. This leads to a level 
effect on the 1983-1984 earning changes. For more details see Appendix A. 
Regions Dummies for the 10 old West German states (excluding Berlin) 
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4. Empirical Implementation and Results 
Elsby (2009) uses an OLS regression to estimate the effect of the inflation rate and the 
average regional real wage change (as proxy for productivity growth) on the percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution and finds evidence for wage compression for the upper 
percentiles. A disadvantage of this OLS regression is that only aggregate data at regional level 
can be used, thereby neglecting the variance and the cross variable covariance in the micro 
data. First, an identical mean does not imply that the distributions are identical, too. Second, 
for example, it is possible to observe two regions with the same mean age of the employees 
and the same composition of the educational classes. Using OLS regression these two regions 
are identical in terms of age and education. But a closer look could reveal that in one region 
mainly young employees are highly educated while in the other region mainly older 
employees are highly educated. Therefore micro data should be used for the analysis 
wherever possible. 
Because of the above mentioned critique we apply two regressions methods. In order to 
enable a comparison with Elsby’s (2009) results, we first apply variants of his OLS approach 
to our data and estimate the impact of inflation and other variables on the percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution. Those approaches only include aggregate data on regional 
level. Second, we apply a new regression method proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(2009) – Unconditional Quantile Regression. It allows to use micro data and to estimate the 
impact of explanatory variables, like inflation, on the percentiles of the unconditional real 
wage change distribution. The advantage of UQR over OLS is that it takes the whole 
distribution of the explanatory variables into account.5 Finally, we shortly compare our results 
with the results Elsby obtained for the US and GB. 
4.1 Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression 
To assess whether the shape of the real wage change distribution varies systematically with 
the inflation rate because of DNWR, we have to make sure that observed differences in the 
shape of the distribution are not due to changes in other variables, like age or regional 
composition of the workforce. To that end we apply the method of DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), henceforth “DFL”, that enables the estimation of counterfactual (re-
weighted) real wage change distributions that would prevail if the distribution of worker 
characteristics did not change. The worker characteristics for the re-weighted density are age, 
age squared, class of worker, a dummy for foreign nationality, qualification level and 
                                                 
5
  We also applied Quantile Regression to the data to look at the effects of the inflation rate or of productivity 
growth on the real wage change distribution conditional on the attributes of the employee and conditional on 
the region where the employee works. The results are shown in Appendix B. 
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occupational field.6 The DFL method is useful because it requires no parametric assumptions 
on the effect of these controls on wage changes. 
We use the re-weighted real wage change distributions to calculate the τ th percentile of the 
distribution for region r at time t ( )rtP ,τ , with τ  = 10, 20, ..., 90. As a first approach we 
estimate the effect of the inflation rate, pi , on 
rtP ,τ  using regressions of the following form: 
( )3
 
As inflation rate, pi , we alternatively use the log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and the log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany. In eq. ( )3  we take into 
account that the location of the real wage change distribution for region r at time t depends on 
productivity growth rtµ  – measured as average regional real wage growth. The vector rtz
contains further control variables shown in Table 2. 
Elsby (2009) uses OLS regressions with region-specific dummies - Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) regressions. But since we regress the different percentiles of one single 
distribution, the residuals are very likely simultaneously correlated across equations. 
Therefore, we use a LSDV approach within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with 
small-sample adjustment and weighting by region size:7 
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The results of the SUR estimates can be found in Table 3.8 Our results show that the upper tail 
of the wage change distribution is compressed as a result of DNWR as predicted by the model 
(see Table 1). The estimated impact of the inflation rate is significantly positive for the 80-
90th percentiles; the coefficients on productivity growth – measured as average regional real 
                                                 
6
  See DiNardo et al. (1996) or Fortin et al. (2010) for a description of the procedure. We apply the DFL 
method to each region and as the “base year” we choose the final sample year (2007). The weights are 
estimated using a probit model according to the Stata ado file provided by Fortin: 
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html. 
7
  We performed “within” Fixed Effects and Random Effects regressions for all percentiles. For each percentile 
we tested whether or not there are significant differences in the coefficients of the two regressions using 
Hausman-Tests. The Hausman-Test was rejected for every percentile, therefore we use a Fixed Effects 
model. 
8
  For comparison, the results of a LSDV regression ignoring the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals 
are documented in Table C1 of Appendix C. 
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wage change – (significantly) exceed unity for these percentiles. These results are consistent 
with lower inflation leading to a compression of wage increases. 
Table 3: Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution 
Consumer Price Index Productivity growth Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
  Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.063 0.027 0.021 0.912† 0.024 0.000 p10 0.007 0.011 0.545 0.945† 0.022 0.000 
p20 -0.114 0.015 0.000 0.858† 0.013 0.000 p20 -0.032 0.006 0.000 0.889† 0.012 0.000 
p30 -0.082 0.016 0.000 0.927† 0.015 0.000 p30 -0.030 0.006 0.000 0.947† 0.013 0.000 
p40 -0.101 0.021 0.000 0.959† 0.019 0.000 p40 -0.069 0.007 0.000 0.952† 0.014 0.000 
p50 -0.088 0.017 0.000 0.958† 0.016 0.000 p50 -0.062 0.006 0.000 0.952† 0.012 0.000 
p60 -0.043 0.015 0.004 0.987 0.013 0.000 p60 -0.042 0.005 0.000 0.975† 0.011 0.000 
p70 0.005 0.013 0.723 1.004 0.012 0.000 p70 -0.014 0.005 0.004 0.991 0.010 0.000 
p80 0.047 0.016 0.003 1.024 0.014 0.000 p80 0.017 0.006 0.007 1.018 0.013 0.000 
p90 0.091 0.033 0.005 1.057 0.029 0.000 p90 0.061 0.013 0.000 1.069† 0.025 0.000 
SUR with small-sample adjustment weighted by region size. Controls: regions, mean age, absolute change in inflation, 
current and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, percentage of the educational classes, percentage of 
workers with foreign nationality, percentage of white-collar worker, percentage of the occupational fields. †: coef. for 
productivity growth significant different from 1 on 5% level. 
For reference, Table 3 also reports estimates on the effects of inflation and productivity 
growth on lower percentiles. Note that the predictions of the model on the coefficients for 
lower percentiles depend on the position of zero nominal wage change in the distribution of 
the real wage change distribution (see Table 1). 
The results for percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are consistent with the 
predictions of the model. In our data the spike at zero nominal wage change predominantly 
appears above the 10th and below the 30th percentile.9 In this percentile range – in Table 3 
represented by the 20th percentile - the coefficients on the inflation rate are significantly 
negative and the coefficients on productivity growth are significantly below one and attenuate 
towards zero compared to the coefficients of the 10th and the 30th percentile. 
For percentiles that predominantly lie below the range of zero nominal wage changes – in our 
case the 10th percentile – the model predicts a coefficient of the inflation rate larger than zero. 
Here the prediction of the model often fails. This may be due to the fact that for 13 years the 
spike at zero nominal changes lies near the 10th percentile (between the 6th and the 14th 
                                                 
9
 Zero nominal wage changes appear in the range between the 6th and the 37th percentile. For the early years of 
our data set with higher inflation the spikes predominantly appear in very low percentiles while for later years, 
with very low inflation, the spikes predominantly appear in higher percentiles of the range. For later years the 
spike is often observed over more than one percentile. Generally we observe the zero nominal wage change 7 
times for percentiles  the 10th percentile, 12 times for the range above the 10th and  the 20st percentile, 24 
times in the range above the 20th and  the 30st percentile and 9 times for percentiles above the 30th percentile. 
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percentile). Using the CPI as inflation rate the coefficient on inflation is significantly 
negative. Using the PPI the coefficient is positive as predicted by the model, but not 
significant. The coefficients on productivity growth are higher than those of the 20th 
percentiles, but they do not rise above unity as predicted by the model. 
4.2 Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using Unconditional Quantile 
Regression 
In the following we apply the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) approach proposed 
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to estimate the impact of explanatory variables, like 
inflation, on the percentiles of the unconditional real wage change distribution taking into 
account the variance and cross variable covariance in the micro data.10 A standard Quantile 
Regression (Koenker/Bassett 1978; Koenker 2005) is only able to observe the effects of 
inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution. Wage changes 
that correspond to a certain conditional percentile can be distributed over the entire observed 
(unconditional) wage change distribution. The UQR, however, allows to estimate the impact 
of changes in the distribution of explanatory variables, X , on the marginal percentiles of the 
dependent variable, Y . A further advantage of applying UQR to the data is that we do not 
need to apply the DFL method in the first step to estimate counterfactual wage change 
distributions. 
To estimate the average marginal effect [ ][ ]XX dPYdE /|Pr τ>  Firpo et al. (2009) propose, 
inter alia, a Recentered Influence Function OLS (RIF-OLS) regression.11 This regression 
provides consistent estimates if [ ]xPY => X|Pr τ  is linear in x . In case of quantiles the 
conditional expectation of the recentered influence function ( )[ ]X|,; YFPYRIFE τ  can be 
viewed as an Unconditional Quantile Regression. 
The RIF-OLS consists of regressing the (recentered) influence function RIF
 
of the outcome 
variable Y  for the thτ  percentile τP  on the explanatory variables X  by OLS. The RIF  is 
computed by estimating the sample percentile τP  and the density of the outcome variable 
( )⋅Yf) , using kernel (or other) methods: ( ) ( ) ττττ ,2,1 ˆˆ;ˆ cPYcPYFIR )) +>⋅= I , where ( )⋅I  is an 
indicator function, ( )ττ PYfc 1,1 =
)
, ( )τPYf  is the density of Y  evaluated at τP  and 
( )ττττ −⋅−= 1,1,2 cPc) . We follow Firpo et al. and use a kernel density estimator 
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, where ( )⋅Yκ  is a kernel function, and 0>b  denotes the scalar 
                                                 
10
  The „unconditional percentiles“ are the percentiles of the marginal distribution of the outcome variable. 
11
  For a short introduction see also Fortin et al. (2010). 
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bandwidth.12 We make use of the RIF-OLS and regress the percentile-transformed individual 
log real wage change on ( )'irttrt piµ zX = . The vector z contains the control variables on 
the individual level wherever possible (see Table 2). To estimate the density of the individual 
log real wage change we use a Gaussian kernel.13 The bandwidth b
 
is set to the ‘optimal’ 
width.14 For the regression we use a ten percent stratified sample of our data.15 The results for 
the UQR can be found in Table 4. 
The UQR shows significantly positive coefficients for the inflation rate for the 90th 
percentiles. These results are consistent with lower inflation leading to a compression of wage 
increases - the upper tail of the unconditional wage change distribution is compressed as a 
result of DNWR. However, only very high wage increases are compressed. In contrast, as has 
been shown above, for the SUR the coefficients for the 80th – 90th percentiles of the inflation 
rate are significantly positive. This points to an overestimation of the compression of wage 
increases using SUR. 
Table 4: Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution 
  Consumer Price Index Productivity growth Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
  Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.043 0.004 0.000 0.862† 0.003 0.000 p10 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.930† 0.003 0.000 
p20 -0.148 0.002 0.000 0.716† 0.002 0.000 p20 -0.002 0.001 0.033 0.778† 0.002 0.000 
p30 -0.152 0.002 0.000 0.813† 0.002 0.000 p30 -0.069 0.001 0.000 0.810† 0.002 0.000 
p40 -0.136 0.002 0.000 0.862† 0.002 0.000 p40 -0.066 0.001 0.000 0.849† 0.001 0.000 
p50 -0.142 0.001 0.000 0.949† 0.001 0.000 p50 -0.081 0.001 0.000 0.911† 0.002 0.000 
p60 -0.165 0.002 0.000 0.993† 0.002 0.000 p60 -0.087 0.001 0.000 0.961† 0.002 0.000 
p70 -0.125 0.002 0.000 0.952† 0.002 0.000 p70 -0.055 0.001 0.000 0.935† 0.002 0.000 
p80 -0.037 0.003 0.000 0.950† 0.003 0.000 p80 -0.010 0.001 0.000 0.939† 0.003 0.000 
p90 0.068 0.005 0.000 0.979† 0.005 0.000 p90 0.061 0.002 0.000 0.991† 0.004 0.000 
Unconditional Quantile Regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, current and 
lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with foreign nationality, 
occupational fields, dummy for white-collar worker. Bootstraped standard errors. 50 replications. †: coef. for productivity 
growth significant different from 1 on 5% level. 
For reference, Table 4 also reports estimates on the effects of inflation and productivity 
growth on lower percentiles. Note that the predictions of the model on the coefficients for 
                                                 
12
  The influence function ( )YFYIF ,;ν  of a distributional statistic ( )YFν  represents the influence of an 
individual observation on that distributional statistic. Adding back the statistic ( )YFν  to the IF  yields what 
Firpo et al. (2009) call the recentered influence function ( )RIF . Therefore for the thτ  percentile the 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ττττττ τ PfPYPFPYIFPFPYRIF YYY >−+=+= I,;,; . 
13
  For the RIF-OLS we used the Stata ado file provided by Fortin: 
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html. 
14
  The ‚optimal‘ width is the width that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were 
Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used. So it is not optimal in a global sense. 
15
  The sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class, occupational field and year. 
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lower percentiles depend on the position of the zero nominal wage change in the distribution 
of the real wage change distribution (see Table 1). In our data the spike at the zero nominal 
wage change predominantly appears between the 10th and the 30th percentile. For an overview 
over the distribution of the position of the zero nominal wage change see footnote 9. 
The results for the percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are consistent with 
the predictions of the model that coefficients on the inflation rate are significantly negative 
and the coefficients on productivity growth are below one and attenuate towards zero. In the 
percentile range above the 10th and below the 30th percentiles – in Table 4 represented by the 
20th percentile - the coefficients on the inflation rate are significantly negative and the 
coefficients on productivity growth are significantly below one and attenuate towards zero 
compared to the coefficients of 10th and the 30th percentile. 
For percentiles below the range of zero nominal wage changes the model predicts coefficients 
of the inflation rate larger than zero. For those percentiles the results of the UQR fit the 
predictions of the model better than the results of the SUR. Using the CPI as inflation rate, the 
coefficient for inflation for the 10th percentile is significantly negative but smaller in absolute 
value than for the SUR. Using the PPI as inflation, the coefficients of the inflation rate for the 
10th percentile are significantly positive. Using SUR we only find a non-significantly positive 
coefficient for the 10th percentile. This points to an underestimation of the compression of the 
left tail of the wage change distribution using SUR. 
As for productivity growth - measured as the average regional wage change - we find 
coefficients that are very similar to those obtained using SUR. The coefficients are highest for 
very high percentiles and the coefficients for the 10th percentiles are higher than for the 20th 
percentiles. However, the coefficients for very high percentiles do not rise above unity. 
4.3 Comparison with results for the US and the UK 
Elsby (2009) analyzes whether a compression of wage increases can be found for the US and 
GB. He uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions with region-specific dummies - a Least 
Squares Dummy Variable regression - to explain variations in the τ th percentile of the DFL 
re-weighted real wage growth distribution by the inflation rate, average regional wage change 
rate (as proxy for productivity growth) and various control variables. This approach is similar 
to our Seemingly Unrelated Regression introduced in Section 4.2. 
For the empirical analysis Elsby (2009) uses data taken from the New Earnings Survey (NES, 
1975-1999) for the UK and data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 
1971-1992) and the Current Population Survey (CPS, 1979-2002) for the US. 
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The results are similar to the results for Germany. They provide evidence that as a result of 
DNWR the upper tail of the real wage change distribution is compressed. For the three data 
sets the estimated impact of inflation is positive for the 70-90th percentiles and often 
significant. The coefficients on productivity growth exceed unity for these upper percentiles 
of the real wage change distribution and are strongly significant. 
For the range of zero nominal wage change the coefficients on inflation are negative, and the 
coefficients on productivity growth attenuate towards zero for all these percentiles. For 
percentiles below the range at zero nominal wage changes the effect of higher inflation is 
diminishing – but not significantly positive. Here the prediction of the model fails as for 
Germany. The coefficient on average regional wage change rises above unity using CPS and 
NES data. 
5. Macroeconomic Implications 
In this section we look at the effect of DNWR on average real wage growth and compare the 
estimated effects using the predictions from the SUR and the UQR. According to the 
underlying theoretical model, downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) should have no 
effect on average real wage growth and hence on the average real wage level. Previous 
empirical studies, however, which neglected the compression of wage increases, report 
positive estimates on the effects of DNWR on average real wage growth (Card and Hyslop, 
1997) or the average real wage level (Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003). 
In the previous section we showed that wage increases in Germany are compressed when 
inflation is low. This compression should dampen the so-called “wage sweep-up” effect of 
DNWR and could even completely annihilate any effect of DNWR on average real wage 
growth. In order to quantify the impact of DNWR on real wage growth, we estimate the 
average log real wage change when inflation is low ( )Lpi  and average log real wage change 
when inflation is high ( )Hpi  and calculate λˆ , the difference of the estimates. If DNWR has no 
effect on average real wage growth, λˆ  should be zero: 
( ) ( )zz ,,|lnEˆ,,|lnEˆˆ µpiµpiλ HL ww ∆−∆= .
          
( )5
 
We estimate the expected average log real wage change using the predictions from the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 
from section 4. For the calculations we use the fact that the mean of a random variable may be 
expressed as a simple average of its percentiles. 
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As for the SUR, we conduct the regression for 99 percentiles. We then use the results to 
simulate 99 percentiles of the real wage change distribution for a given inflation rate pi  for 
each region. Finally we calculate the region size weighted means for the 99 percentiles .|piτP  
As for the UQR, we estimate the effect of inflation for the 99,..,2,1=τ  percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution. We then use the results to simulate 99 real wage change 
distributions for a given inflation rate pi . Finally we use the thτ  simulated distribution to 
calculate the τ th percentile piτ |P . 
We apply these procedures for the SUR and the UQR for low inflation Lpi  as well as for high 
inflation Hpi , and then calculate λˆ  using the predicted percentiles τP , for 99,...,2,1=τ . 
Hence, .99||ˆ
99
1
99
1






−≈ ∑∑
==
HL PP pipiλ
τ
τ
τ
τ  
We use a value for Lpi  equal to 1% and a value for Hpi  equal to 6%.
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 Since we estimate λˆ  
using a difference in inflation of five percentage points, we can interpret 5ˆλ  as the average 
change in average real wage growth caused by a decrease in inflation by one percentage point. 
According to the results shown in Table 5, a decrease in inflation by one percentage point 
causes an average increase of real wage growth between 0.003% and 0.060%. Our results, 
using the PPI as inflation rate, are in line with Elsby’s (2009) results: for the US a decrease in 
inflation by one percentage point causes an average increase of real wage growth in the range 
of 0.002%-0.008% and for the UK of 0.001%. However, using the CPI as inflation, as Elsby 
does, our results show stronger effects on average real wage growth. Still, all results indicate 
that the effects of DNWR in combination with low inflation on average real wage growth, and 
hence on aggregate real wages, are quite small. 
Table 5: Increase of the average real wage growth due to a decrease in inflation 
Regression 
method 
Average log real wage change caused by a 
decrease in inflation by 1 percentage point ( )5ˆλ  
SURCPI 0.013% 
SURPPI 0.003% 
UQRCPI 0.060% 
UQRPPI 0.003% 
 
Unfortunately, a comparison with results from previous studies (e.g., Card and Hyslop, 1997; 
Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003) is not possible. Those studies use a counterfactual wage 
change distribution - a distribution that would prevail if DNWR would not bind - to calculate 
                                                 
16
  These inflation rates lie in the range of observed inflation rates during the sample period, using both the CPI 
and the PPI as inflation rate (see Table A2). 
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the wage sweep-up.17 According to our results, the identification of a counterfactual wage 
change distribution is not possible because the whole distribution is affected by DNWR. 
Hence, we cannot ascertain by how much previous studies overestimate the effect of DNWR 
on average real wage change. However, we certainly know that they do overestimate it. 
To get an insight into the effects of inflation on the amount of real wage cuts and increases we 
estimate ( )pi|lnE w∆  for negative and for positive real wage changes (see Table 6).18 The 
results confirm that with low inflation a compression of wage increases takes place – the 
expected real wage increases during low inflation are smaller than the expected real wage 
increases during high inflation. With rising inflation the expected real wage increases get 
larger, but less people experience a real wage increase. For example, the results for the UQR 
using the CPI as inflation rate show that for low inflation 59% of the workers experience a 
real wage increase while for high inflation only 55% experience a real wage increase. 
However, in the latter case the wage increase is more pronounced. In contrast, for low 
inflation only 40% of the worker experience a real wage cut while for high inflation 44% 
experience a real wage cut. It is in this sense that inflation greases the wheels of the labor 
market in the presence of DNWR. 
Table 6: Conditional expected real wage change for negative and for positive real wage 
changes 
Regression 
method 
Lpipi =  Hpipi =  
( )0ln|lnE <∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE ≥∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE <∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE ≥∆∆ ww  
SURCPI -3.440% (33) 4.224% (66) -3.208% (38) 4.599% (61) 
SURPPI -3.411% (34) 4.300% (65) -3.134% (37) 4.481% (62) 
UQRCPI -5.120% (40) 8.651% (59) -5.036% (44) 9.048% (55) 
UQRPPI -5.249% (40) 8.668% (59) -4.881% (43) 9.108% (56) 
The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
                                                 
17
  Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) using the IABS from the Institute for Employment Research - a 1% random 
sample drawn from the German social-security accounts – for the years 1975-1995, estimate at zero inflation 
a sweep-up range from 0.3 to 0.4 additional percentage points of individual expected real wage growth due to 
wage rigidity. Cornelißen and Hübler (2008) using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the 
years 1984-2004, estimate that downward wage rigidity increases real wage growth by 3.4 to 4.9 percentage 
points. 
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We also estimate ( )pi|lnE w∆  for negative and positive nominal wage changes (see 
Table 7).19 The results show that, as expected, with high inflation one observes less nominal 
wage cuts. For example, the results for the UQR with the CPI as inflation rate show that 33% 
of the workers experience a nominal wage cut when inflation is low, while with high inflation 
only 13% experience a nominal wage cut. 
Table 7: Conditional expected real wage change for negative and for positive nominal wage 
changes 
Regression 
method 
Lpipi =  Hpipi =  
( )pi−<∆∆ ww ln|lnE
 
( )pi−≥∆∆ ww ln|lnE
 
( )pi−<∆∆ ww ln|lnE
 
( )pi−≥∆∆ ww ln|lnE
 
SURCPI -4.723% (23) 3.604% (76) -9.154% (6) 2.296% (93) 
SURPPI -4.631% (24) 3.662% (75) -9.234% (6) 2.336% (93) 
UQRCPI -6.111% (33) 7.686% (66) -11.105% (13) 4.889% (86) 
UQRPPI -6.247% (33) 7.691% (66) -11.427% (12) 5.027% (87) 
The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that in times of low inflation downward 
nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) not only hinders wage cuts but also leads to a compression of 
wage increases. If the latter effect is taken into account, DNWR has a negligible effect on 
average real wage growth, and hence on aggregate real wages. 
The empirical analysis has been undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 
using the IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. In line with the 
literature our analysis has been confined to “job stayers”, i.e. full-time employees who 
continually exercise the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive years. 
After our data selection we were still able to analyze about 169 million earnings changes, i.e. 
an average of more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year. The huge sample size and the 
reliable earnings data are great advantages for our analysis of the impact of DNWR on the 
shape of the real wage change distribution. 
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Applying Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to the percentiles of the log real wage 
change distribution at the regional level, we have shown that in Germany a compression of 
wage increases takes place due to DNWR – wage increases are compressed when inflation is 
low. Because the SUR approach does not consider the variance and the cross variable 
covariance of the micro data, we have also applied Unconditional Quantile Regression 
(UQR). This allows to estimate the impact of changing the distribution of explanatory 
variables on the marginal percentiles of the dependent variable. Using UQR we estimated the 
impact of inflation on the percentiles of the unconditional real wage change distribution. The 
results confirm a compression of wage increases due to DNWR. But compared to the SUR 
estimates less percentiles of the wage change distribution are affected. This points to an 
overestimation of the compression of wage increases using SUR. 
As for the macroeconomic implications of DNWR we find that a decrease in inflation of one 
percentage point only causes an average increase in real wage growth between 0.003% and 
0.060%. These results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument against low 
inflation targets. 
The results can also be used to evaluate different approaches to analyze DNWR in micro data. 
Our empirical results show that low inflation in combination with DNWR also affects the 
upper tail of the wage change distribution. As a consequence, approaches such as the 
normality approach by Borghijs (2001) and the symmetry approach by Card and Hyslop 
(1997) that assume a symmetric counterfactual wage change distribution and infer the shape 
of the lower tail of the counterfactual using the upper part of the wage change distribution are 
seriously flawed. Also other approaches are challenged, like the earnings-function approach 
by Altonji and Devereux (2000), the histogram-location approach by Kahn (1997), or the 
approach based on the generalized hyperbolic distribution by Behr and Pötter (2010). They do 
not assume symmetry of the unconditional counterfactual wage change distribution, but they 
also assume that DNWR does not affect higher percentiles of the real wage change 
distribution - an assumption which is challenged by our empirical results. 
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Appendix A: Data Selection and Description 
For our analysis we only use the earning spells of male employees from West Germany20 aged 
16 to 65. We distinguish between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. The workers 
must be subject to social security without particular tokens and being gainfully employed in 
the same occupation by the same employer throughout the year for at least two consecutive 
years. The earnings are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitrags-
bemessungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored the earnings changes cannot 
be computed correctly. Since the monthly income is censored too, it is possible that yearly 
earnings are below the contribution assessment ceiling, even if several monthly earnings are 
censored. This causes some noise for earnings hardly below the contribution assessment 
ceiling. Therefore earnings spells above 0.96 times the contribution assessment ceiling of the 
compulsory pension insurance scheme are dropped. 
We also control for further employment spells. If a person has more than one employment 
spell liable to social security – regardless of full- or part-time – we drop the employment 
spell(s) of that person for the particular year. Still, there are some implausibly high growth 
rates of (annual) earnings – up to 260 percent. Until 1999 these are concentrated mainly in the 
group of employees younger than 25 years. This is because not every change in an 
employment relationship leads to a new spell. For example, until 1999 the BeH item ‘class of 
worker’ contains only the last status of the particular year. If a person ends an apprenticeship 
in the middle of a year, and then is gainfully employed by the same employer for the rest of 
the year as well as the next year, we will observe the person as being gainfully employed two 
years in row. Given that after the apprenticeship the respective person is typically earning 
more than double the previous income, an implausibly high growth rate of annual earnings is 
observed. To make sure that this and other effects are not at work in our data, we only analyze 
(annual) wage changes that are higher than the one percent percentile and lower than the 99 
percent percentile. 
After the selection, the remaining spells comprise 50,575,416 salary changes of white-collar 
workers as well as 118,593,371 wage changes of blue-collar workers (see Table A1). 
                                                 
20
  Except (West) Berlin. 
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Table A1: Earnings spells, and observable earnings changes for the BeH and our datasets 
Year Employee History File (BeH)  
Source: IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH) V08.01, Nürnberg 2009, Tab. 3.4, pp. 13-14. 
Dataset for white-collar workers 
(job stayers) 
 
Dataset for blue-collar workers 
(job stayers) 
total BeH white-collar workers blue-collar workers 
Number of 
spells 
Number of 
persons 
Number of 
new persons 
Number of 
spells 
% of all 
BeH spells 
Number of 
spells 
% of all BeH 
spells 
Observable salary 
changes to the 
previous year 
% of all white-
collar workers 
spells 
Observable wage 
changes to the 
previous year 
% of all blue-
collar 
workers spells 
1975 25,477,714 22,229,687 22,229,687 8,017,135 31.47 13,115,611 51.48 -------------- ------- -------------- ------- 
1976 26,312,435 22,027,301 1,821,120 8,162,966 31.02 13,588,660 51.64 1,223,461 14.99 4,001,617 29.45 
1977 26,536,964 22,268,246 1,524,711 8,326,823 31.38 13,423,461 50.58 1,339,689 16.09 4,008,105 29.86 
1978 26,582,142 22,280,456 1,422,128 8,504,452 31.99 13,125,102 49.38 1,455,036 17.11 3,987,076 30.38 
1979 27,735,013 23,050,680 1,519,340 8,741,313 31.52 13,666,833 49.28 1,549,174 17.72 4,026,094 29.46 
1980 27,915,481 23,368,670 1,447,888 8,958,331 32.09 13,641,632 48.87 1,550,299 17.31 4,074,915 29.87 
1981 27,446,754 23,465,968 1,234,982 9,062,261 33.02 13,059,120 47.58 1,613,492 17.80 4,229,974 32.39 
1982 26,601,318 23,174,161 1,115,916 8,912,796 33.51 12,293,271 46.21 1,724,945 19.35 4,267,181 34.71 
1983 25,999,555 22,761,297 1,084,306 8,785,081 33.79 11,786,115 45.33 1,823,678 20.76 4,260,338 36.15 
1984 26,649,448 22,892,553 1,145,787 8,811,489 33.06 12,226,538 45.88 1,652,739 18.76 4,057,593 33.19 
1985 26,704,365 22,781,837 1,091,527 8,759,642 32.80 12,232,551 45.81 1,541,769 17.60 3,966,506 32.43 
1986 27,541,879 23,436,642 1,119,212 9,256,438 33.61 12,326,805 44.76 1,539,611 16.63 4,014,362 32.57 
1987 28,116,787 23,677,568 1,074,500 9,554,798 33.98 12,439,379 44.24 1,555,887 16.28 4,018,113 32.30 
1988 28,698,344 23,786,816 1,033,231 9,882,373 34.44 12,667,343 44.14 1,587,020 16.06 3,988,695 31.49 
1989 29,822,255 24,267,501 1,199,883 10,322,363 34.61 13,178,397 44.19 1,587,684 15.38 3,961,452 30.06 
1990 31,784,818 25,217,847 1,645,845 10,910,750 34.33 14,143,744 44.50 1,517,988 13.91 3,815,151 26.97 
1991 37,527,796 30,390,685 6,141,237 11,316,503 30.15 14,230,801 37.92 1,485,069 13.12 3,912,383 27.49 
1992 39,806,357 32,367,400 4,452,503 14,526,173 36.49 17,151,872 43.09 1,518,998 10.46 4,086,827 23.83 
1993 38,726,145 31,468,111 1,258,045 14,288,414 36.90 16,307,187 42.11 1,559,944 10.92 4,040,428 24.78 
1994 37,109,938 30,765,834 1,150,297 13,658,194 36.80 15,413,334 41.53 1,678,306 12.29 3,993,359 25.91 
1995 37,428,190 30,718,658 1,158,163 13,808,067 36.89 15,391,415 41.12 1,704,648 12.35 3,872,681 25.16 
1996 36,116,981 30,284,347 1,096,866 13,279,672 36.77 14,530,125 40.23 1,695,637 12.77 3,759,385 25.87 
1997 36,708,737 30,034,750 1,224,453 13,221,938 36.02 14,277,362 38.89 1,755,706 13.28 3,765,959 26.38 
1998 37,126,961 30,696,402 1,485,883 13,559,574 36.52 13,878,339 37.38 1,716,299 12.66 3,620,074 26.08 
1999 45,866,082 35,023,973 2,979,728 14,432,989 31.47 14,799,245 32.27 1,582,533 10.96 3,311,996 22.38 
2000 48,046,644 35,989,747 1,700,270 14,635,674 30.46 15,064,596 31.35 1,538,716 10.51 3,222,105 21.39 
2001 48,957,095 36,063,811 1,421,173 15,132,476 30.91 15,157,937 30.96 1,479,744 9.78 3,057,588 20.17 
2002 47,356,880 35,459,833 1,185,798 14,927,452 31.52 14,240,501 30.07 1,422,480 9.53 2,906,075 20.41 
2003 50,878,383 35,163,454 1,142,687 14,850,117 29.19 14,130,373 27.77 1,450,294 9.77 2,901,505 20.53 
2004 47,152,731 35,076,422 1,105,978 14,314,460 30.36 13,370,424 28.36 1,650,762 11.53 2,889,431 21.61 
2005 46,250,593 34,574,481 1,092,777 13,542,098 29.28 12,957,363 28.02 1,710,424 12.63 2,920,200 22.54 
2006 47,148,366 34,856,424 1,154,210 13,559,054 28.76 13,237,171 28.08 1,759,427 12.98 2,907,775 21.97 
2007 49,182,872 35,427,149 1,235,771 14,326,287 29.13 13,710,683 27.88 1,603,957 11.20 2,748,428 20.05 
Sum 1,171,326,023 ---------------- 72,695,902 382,348,153 32.64 454,763,290 38.82 50,575,416 13.23 118,593,371 26.08 
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For each employee we have the following information: 
Gross annual earnings: 
• salary: gross annual salary of a full-time white-collar worker 
• wage: gross annual wage of a full-time worker 
The earnings are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungs-
grenze). Spells with censored earnings, as well as spells with earnings higher than 0.96 times 
the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme, are dropped. 
The lower limit of earnings is given by the earnings limit for “marginal” part-time 
workers/fringe workers (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze; see Table A2). These workers are not 
included in the BeH. 
The BeH does not allow separating fringe benefits from “regular” earnings. This is important 
because before 1984 the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. Since 1984, 
one-time payments to employees have been subject to social security taxation and are 
therefore included in the data. This leads to a level effect on the 1983-1984 (log) earnings 
changes. However, observations before and after 1984 should be valid. If some employers 
reported fringe benefits before 1984 and other did not, it is very likely that employers were 
usually consistent in their reporting behaviour.  
Gross average daily earnings: 
• gross average daily salary of a full-time white-collar worker 
• gross average daily wage of a full-time blue-collar worker 
The BeH contains no data on hours worked except for information about part-time or full-
time employment. Therefore, it is not possible to compute hourly earnings. Since we cannot 
observe changes in the working time – as long as the threshold for part-time employment is 
not crossed –we sometimes observe implausibly high growth rates of (annual) earnings. 
Using gross annual earnings and the duration of the employment spell, we calculate gross 
average daily earnings. Since white-collar workers are being paid the same salary every 
month – irrespective of the number of working days – we calculate the gross average daily 
salary for a 365-day year. For workers we use the exact duration of the employment spell to 
calculate the gross average daily wages. To avoid any contamination with working time 
effects, only full-time employment spells are included. 
Duration of employment: 
The duration of employment is not consistent with the actual days worked, but represents the 
duration of the employment contract liable to social security. To make sure that a person is 
employed all the year, we drop all spells with durations of employment of less than 365 days. 
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Employment relationship: 
The BeH contains 32 classifications for employment relationships – such as trainees, insured 
artistes and publicists and employees in partial retirement. We only keep employees subject to 
social security without particular tokens. 
Class of worker: 
The BeH contains eight classes of workers: (1) trainees, (2) workers, (3) skilled workers21, (4) 
master craftsmen and foremen22, (5) white-collar workers, (6) home workers, (7) people with 
less than 18 weekly hours of work, and (8) people with 18 and more weekly hours of work but 
not fully employed.  
We drop all classes except of ‘white-collar workers’, ‘workers’ and ‘skilled workers’. The 
two latter classes are combined to the class ‘blue-collar workers’. 
Occupational classification: 
This variable describes the field of an employee’s occupational specialization. The BeH 
covers 86 occupation groups containing 328 occupations. These groups are use to control for 
job stayer. They are subsumed to six occupational fields which are used in the regressions. 
Qualification level of an employee: 
This variable includes eight categories: (1) no formal education, (2) lower secondary school 
and intermediate (secondary) school without vocational qualification, (3) lower secondary 
school and intermediate (secondary) school with vocational qualification, (4) upper secondary 
school examination without vocational qualification, (5) upper secondary school examination 
with vocational qualification, (6) post-secondary technical college degree, (7) university 
degree, and (8) no classification applicable. 
The qualification level ‘no classification applicable’ is subsumed to ‘no formal education’. 
Age of a person: 
Age a person is turning in the particular year – only spells from persons aged 16 to 65 are 
kept. 
  
                                                 
21
  The class also contains master craftsmen and foremen (Bender et al., 1996). 
22
  Persons in this class are employed as blue-collar or white-collar workers. 
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Further data: 
Inflation: 
As inflation we use two variables: 
- Change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany to the previous year (see 
Table A2). We interlinked the CPI (available for 1995-2007) with the cost-of-living 
index of all private households for West Germany (available for 1962-1999). 
- Change of the Producer Price Index for Germany to the previous year (see Table A2). 
 
Table A2: Contribution assessment ceiling for Western Germany, lower earnings limit, and 
inflation 
Contribution assessment ceiling for Western Germany (Euro per year)23 Change of the German 
Consumer Price 
Index24 to the previous 
year in % 
Change of the German 
Producer Price 
Index25 to the previous 
year in % 
Year Compulsory pension insurance scheme 
‘Knappschaftliche’ 
pension insurance 
Lower earnings limit 
(§8, Social Code IV) 
1975 17,179.41 20,860.71 2,147.40  6,03 4.66 
1976 19,020.06 23,314.91 2,377.56  4,22 3.74 
1977 20,860.71 25,769.11 *2,607.60  3,70 2.75 
1978 22,701.36 28,223.31 2,392.80  2,72 1.17 
1979 24,542.01 29,450.41 2,392.80  4,13 4.63 
1980 25,769.11 31,291.06 2,392.80  5,40 7.58 
1981 26,996.21 33,131.71 2,392.80  6,33 7.78 
1982 28,836.86 35,585.91 2,392.80  5,24 5.99 
1983 30,677.51 37,426.57 2,392.80  3,23 1.41 
1984 31,904.61 39,267.22 2,392.80  2,48 2.92 
1985 33,131.71 41,107.87 2,454.24  2,04 2.34 
1986 34,358.81 42,334.97 2,515.56  -0,12 -2.53 
1987 34,972.36 43,562.07 2,638.32  0,25 -2.35 
1988 36,813.02 44,789.17 2,699.64  1,25 1.14 
1989 37,426.57 46,016.27 2,760.96  2,83 3.25 
1990 38,653.67 47,856.92 2,883.72  2,63 1.69 
1991 39,880.77 49,084.02 2,945.04  3,73 2.38 
1992 41,721.42 51,538.22 3,067.80  3,93 1.40 
1993 44,175.62 54,605.97 3,251.76  3,57 0.00 
1994 46,629.82 57,673.72 3,435.84  2,71 0.57 
1995 47,856.92 58,900.82 3,558.60  1,63 1.71 
1996 49,084.02 60,127.93 3,619.92  1,38 -1.23 
1997 50,311.12 61,968.58 3,742.68  1,93 1.25 
1998 51,538.22 63,195.68 3,804.00  1,00 -0.45 
1999 52,151.77 63,809.23 3,865.32  0,55 -1.01 
2000 52,765.32 65,036.33 3,865.32  1,42 3.07 
2001 53,378.87 65,649.88 3,865.32  1,94 2.98 
2002 54,000.00 66,600.00 3,900.00  1,48 -0.64 
2003 61,200.00 75,000.00 3,900.00  1,04 1.73 
2004 61,800.00 76,200.00 4,800.00  1,65 1.59 
2005 62,400.00 76,800.00 4,800.00  1,52 4.38 
2006 63,000.00 77,400.00 4,800.00  1,60 5.40 
2007 63,000.00 77,400.00 4,800.00  2,26 1.33 
* Ex July 1st, 1977: € 2,270.16. 
 
                                                 
23
  Values from 1975 until 2001 converted from DM into Euro. Source: Deutsch Rentenversicherung 
Knappschaft-Bahn-See; Hauptverwaltung Bochum. 
24
  Consumer Price Index for Germany (1995-2007) interlinked with the cost-of-living index of all private 
households for West Germany (1974-1994). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
25
  Development of prices ex 1995 are based on the development in the whole Federal Republic of Germany. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2, 10/2009, p. 27. 
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Contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze): 
The earnings covered by the BeH are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling. 
The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes of earnings. Some 
employees – miners, mine-employees, sailors and railroad employees – are insured in a 
special pension insurance, called ‘knappschaftliche’ pension insurance. The contribution 
assessment ceiling of this pension insurance is always higher than for the compulsory pension 
insurance scheme (see Table A2). Since 1999, the BeH does not indicate anymore in which 
pension insurance a person is insured. For this reason, we only use the contribution 
assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme. 
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Appendix B: Impact of Inflation on the Conditional Percentiles using Quantile 
Regression 
To observe the effect of inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage change 
distribution we regress real wage change w∆  on the inflation rate pi , the average regional 
real wage growth µ  (as a proxy for productivity growth), and further control variables. 
We make use of the Quantile Regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2005) and 
model conditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution as functions of predictors: 
( ) ( ) ( ).  with| ''' irttrtirtirtirtw piµQ i zxβxx ==∆ ττ  
The vector z contains, as for the Unconditional Quantile Regression, the control variables 
(see Table 2). For the Quantile Regressions (QR) we use a one percent stratified sample of our 
data.26  
The results (see Table B1) show that at some degree not only the highest wage increases are 
compressed if inflation is low (see results Chapter 4.1), but that also the highest wage 
increases conditional on the attributes of the employee and conditional on the region where 
the employee works are compressed if inflation is low and DNWR binds. 
Table B1: Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the conditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution using Quantile Regression 
  Consumer Price Index Productivity growth Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
  Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.075 0.012 0.000 0.904† 0.007 0.000 p10 0.020 0.005 0.000 0.966† 0.009 0.000 
p20 -0.138 0.007 0.000 0.847† 0.005 0.000 p20 -0.028 0.003 0.000 0.876† 0.004 0.000 
p30 -0.148 0.005 0.000 0.854† 0.004 0.000 p30 -0.060 0.002 0.000 0.849† 0.004 0.000 
p40 -0.152 0.004 0.000 0.865† 0.003 0.000 p40 -0.080 0.002 0.000 0.841† 0.003 0.000 
p50 -0.142 0.004 0.000 0.871† 0.003 0.000 p50 -0.081 0.002 0.000 0.838† 0.003 0.000 
p60 -0.114 0.005 0.000 0.876† 0.004 0.000 p60 -0.066 0.002 0.000 0.843† 0.004 0.000 
p70 -0.072 0.006 0.000 0.893† 0.005 0.000 p70 -0.044 0.002 0.000 0.866† 0.005 0.000 
p80 -0.019 0.009 0.036 0.906† 0.006 0.000 p80 -0.011 0.004 0.002 0.888† 0.006 0.000 
p90 0.002 0.017 0.909 0.919† 0.012 0.000 p90 0.040 0.006 0.000 0.942† 0.010 0.000 
Quantile Regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged unemployment rate, 
dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with foreign nationality, occupational fields, dummy for white-collar worker. 
Bootstraped standard errors. 50 replications. †: coef. for productivity growth significant different from 1 on 5% level. 
 
  
                                                 
26
  Sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class, occupational field and year. 
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Appendix C: Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Regression 
We estimate regressions with region-specific dummies of the following form by OLS: 
rtrt rtrtt
zP ττττττ ερµβpiηα ++++= ' , where rtPτ  is the thτ  percentile of the DFL re-weighted 
real wage growth distribution in region r  at time t , rtµ  is the frictionless average real wage 
growth (measured using the observed regional average real wage growth rate), tpi  is the 
inflation rate. The vector rtz  contains further control variables shown in Table 2. 
Table C1: Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution using Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression 
  Consumer Price Index Productivity growth Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
  Coef. 
R.Std. 
Err. P>|t| Coef. 
R.Std. 
Err. P>|t|   Coef. 
R.Std. 
Err. P>|t| Coef. 
R.Std. 
Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.063 0.062 0.317 0.912 0.052 0.000 p10 0.007 0.019 0.722 0.945 0.044 0.000 
p20 -0.114 0.025 0.000 0.858† 0.026 0.000 p20 -0.032 0.013 0.021 0.889† 0.028 0.000 
p30 -0.082 0.031 0.013 0.927 0.036 0.000 p30 -0.030 0.013 0.035 0.947 0.033 0.000 
p40 -0.101 0.048 0.041 0.959 0.048 0.000 p40 -0.069 0.015 0.000 0.952 0.038 0.000 
p50 -0.088 0.040 0.035 0.958 0.039 0.000 p50 -0.062 0.010 0.000 0.952 0.027 0.000 
p60 -0.043 0.035 0.233 0.987 0.032 0.000 p60 -0.042 0.008 0.000 0.975 0.022 0.000 
p70 0.005 0.030 0.878 1.004 0.025 0.000 p70 -0.014 0.009 0.133 0.991 0.021 0.000 
p80 0.047 0.032 0.144 1.024 0.030 0.000 p80 0.017 0.013 0.181 1.018 0.030 0.000 
p90 0.091 0.059 0.129 1.057 0.058 0.000 p90 0.061 0.022 0.010 1.069 0.052 0.000 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression. We estimate the regressions weighed by region size and relax the assumption of independence 
within years. Controls: regions, mean age, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, 
percentage of the educational classes, percentage of workers with foreign nationality, percentage of white-collar worker, percentage of the 
occupational fields. †: coef. for productivity growth significant different from 1 on 5% level. 
The estimated coefficients of this Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression are 
identical to those of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with small-sample 
adjustment and weighting by region size of Section 4.1. But the residuals differ since the 
LSDV regression ignores the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals. 
A comparison with the results of SUR shows that all estimated coefficients of the SUR are at 
least as significant as the results of the LSDV regression and most coefficients of the SUR – 
especially those for the inflation – are even more highly significant as the coefficients of the 
LSDV regression. 
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